In any military situation where a significant buildup of firepower is concentrated in a given area, the potential for disaster in the form of fratricide, [or "friendly fire"] is unavoidable. Elements beyond the control of conventional warfare have caused hundreds of deaths by friendly fire in the last decade alone, particularly in the Desert Storm effort of 1992. Since this time, considerable efforts and money have been set forth to find ways of avoiding fratricide, as the protection of United States soldiers is of utmost concern, and has a level of importance that supercedes all others. The protection of human life has values that cannot be labeled with any price tag.
This paper is a compilation of ideas and theories that can be applied to, or used in place of current military tactics in order to achieve a condition where fratricide can be eliminated, or significantly reduced. It takes into account several different forms of identification possibilities, and theories on how communications can take place between command and soldiers in order to create definitive tactical superiority in the battlefield. This paper also keeps the information limited within the scope of a fluid combat situation, where two or more units from opposing forces collide with each other in a combat situation in a hostile environment.
The methodologies for avoidance of fratricide that are discussed in this paper are the following:
RF Tag Identification
JSTAR System Observation (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar)
UAV (Unmanned Arial Vehicle)
MDATS (Multifunctional Data Acquisition and Transmission System)
Camouflage Identification System
Some of the above listed methods for tracking the movement of troops, and identifying them as either friendly or dangerous, as well as being able to identify individual elements down to a given granularity are in the stages of being proposed by defense contractors to the DOD, while others are purely theoretical, and are more guided by our team's vision for the future.
What methods are used to avoid friendly fire? How do these methods work and interoperate with each other? When and where are these methods most effective, taking into account weather and terrain?
Mohammad M. Nemeth
Friendly fire casualties have occurred in nearly every war the United States has fought. Such incident can be saddening and should be avoided. As we enter the age of technological warfare, solutions to such problem have to be sought after. That's why DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Project Agency) teamed up with the U.S. army in developing systems to prevent similar incidents on future battlefield. One of the latest developments is the BCIS (Battlefield combat identification system). With BCIS solders can put their cross heirs on a target and determine whether it's a friend or an enemy. Along with BCIS other systems are being considered and are very well under way into being integrated for military use, such as the passive-passive system, and RF tags. With the newest technological advancements, military analyst is predicting the out come will bring forth more efficiency and fewer casualties within our troops in future battlefields.
The BCIS is a millimeter-wave system that allows tank gunners to electronically query and identify potential targets before firing at one another. Solders are going to be equipped with Dismounted Soldier Battlefield Combat Identification System (DSBCIS) that will be incorporated onto an M16-A2 rifle as part of a complete combat identification system for fratricide reduction. The development of this system will include: a rifle mounted on antenna interrogator, a helmet mounted, omni-directional responder, a visual and audible indicator, a spread spectrum communication system, GPS, and power pack.
In an air to ground battle situation awareness capability will be attained through the CAC2 ATD which will provide the information required to create common picture (Display) of the battlefield situation including the position of both friendly and enemy forces. Displayed information will be available at various echelon levels facilitating the distribution of data to reduce friendly casualties while improving command and control.
The BCIS reliability has been identified through military training simulation. Probability of the correct data at a range of 100 meters was at 90% but they're being continuously upgraded for more accuracy. In case one system fails, there is a backup, which is the passive-passive.
The passive-passive is a system in which is supported by satellites and surveillance plane (JSTAR) as well. It would track the locations of friendly troop vehicle and when gunners attempt to lock on a target the central command computer would compare the location of the vehicle being targeted if it is part of the friendly vehicles before firing, via satellite or surveillance plane.
The RF tags relies heavily on airborne radars that are constantly communicating with ground friendly vehicles that are equipped with sensors to relay their location to the radar. This process keeps track of every one and their constantly changing locations. Thus, adding advantage to the troops in situations where clear battlelines are less likely to occur and friendly, unfriendly, and neutral forces will be mixed with non-combatants.
Weather and terrain can play a role against the military, if the situation is one that was not anticipated. More recently, Gulf War media coverage provided stark images of vehicles stranded in mud caused by violent winter rains, tank battles masked in fog and helicopters flying over burning oil fields generating dense smoke and obscuring vision. In Bosnia military envoy accidents, driving over bridges that are not stable. These are situations of weather and terrain that subject the U.S. troops for danger that may lead to casualties.
To sum up on the material that was covered is to describe a scenario like a simulation of a C3 and troop movement. Imagine, if you will, how all what I Discussed can interact in a live combat. Supposing the enemy is in a jungle right Off the water, just like in Vietnam. The attack is supported by water, land, and Air military troops. It is then, vital to use (BCIS), passive-passive, RF tags systems in order to prevent friendly fire casualties. All this can be done simply When a gunner point at a target his/her (BCIS) will relay data to central command and in return it will check, in synchronized fashion for a yes/no shoot out. These are the most recent advancements the military come up with, in order to reduce friendly fire casualties.
Brijesh M. Ruwala
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is helping the US military to reduce the number of friendly fires that occur in the battlefield for present and future wars. We should take a look at the Proposer Information Pamphlet (PIP) titled "Tactical Technology Solicitations: BAA 97-14", where there is a description of what it is that the DARPA is looking for reducing friendly fire situation. They are looking in to two areas Communications & Situation Awareness Enabling Technology whose main objective is to develop and demonstrate enabling technologies in the area of tactical communications and situation awareness. These technologies are not to be total communication or awareness systems, but rather, highly innovative, discrete technologies that, when integrated with other technologies by a separate integration and development contractor, could result in revolutionary improvements in soldier communication and situation awareness. These discrete technologies would contribute to an envisioned future situation awareness system that would maintain continuous data communications between multiple dismounted maneuvering warfighters that are dispersed in highly restrictive environments scenarios over and operating area of at least 200 km by 200 km and in all types of weather. [(1)] These technologies should be emphasis more on operation in urban and forest area, which should have the capacity to position determination methods using communications time of arrival techniques, and situation awareness while inside and adjacentto buildings, tunnels, and other structures commonly found in an urban environment. By using this technologies the following types of data would be communicated: 1) critical low bandwidth data (on the order of 10 bps) consisting of alerts, soldier geo location , situation awareness and orders; 2) other digital data (10 bps to 128 kbps) of varying priority (sensor data and soldier data); 3) intermittent, low duty cycle, multi-cast voice; and 4) occasional compressed video (128 kbps or greater). The technologies should have the characteristics of Low-probability of intercept (LPI), low probability of detection (LPD) and anti-jam (AJ) better than currently fielded radios. [1]
The SUO situation awareness function will provide the warfighter with real-time information tailored in granularity and content to the sphere of the influence and information requirements of the specific unit or individual warefighter. Situation awareness and understanding should consist of tactical picture generation and display, tactical planning, forecasting, tasking and control functions.
According to DARPA they are looking in two areas 1) Communications Enabling Technology and 2) Situation Awareness Enabling Technology.
Five Communications Enabling Technology areas of particular interest to DARPA are: 1) Technologies that would significantly improve range and/or bandwidth in restrictive, multi-user, networked environments to ensure communications connectivity; 2) Technologies and processes to enable radio relays and relay networks; 3) Advanced communications protocols that enable robust, adaptable network and point-to-point communications among dispersed maneuvering individual warfighters in restrictive environments; 4) Geo location technologies that use the SUO communication signals or localized supplemental signals to provide the three dimensional location of each warfighter to within 3m accuracy in restrictive environments. Systems which can provide geolocation over a large city area with a minimal soldier burden; 5) Innovative methods of achieving verification of the user's identity to guard against compromised communicatios in the event of capture/coercion.[1]
Five situation awareness technology areas of particular interest to DARPA are: 1) Situation awareness applications software for techniques for filtering, fusing and reasoning with uncertain information; relevant representation of information at different levels of granularity; planning and situation assessment algorithms; tools and approaches for engineering modular, comparable reconfigurable software, and automated forecast of the tactical situation; 2) User interfaces suitable for individual warfighter use such as small, low power visual display devices; aural or other output devices; and voice, handwritten, and pointing devices; 3) small, low power, high capacity data storage devices, excluding rotating media, that are visible for inclusion in an individual warfihgter's situation awareness device; 4) information sharing technologies that enable the migration of processes and information to the optimal location such as collaborative computing, location independent processing, and highly interactive access/use of shared objects; 5) Low cost, low power, light weight tracking devices that can provide unique identification of friendly personnel, vehicles, weapons and other assets over long ranges in restrictive environments.[
1]
RF Tags use airborne radars (both Moving Target Indication (MTI) and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)) that communicate directly with ground devices to provide identification of friendly assets, to communicate information from ground sensors to the platform, and to correct for errors in the radar-determined location of targets. The significant technical barrier with this class of systems is the difficulty of obtaining target identification using radar data alone. RF tags will enhance the utility of airborne radar systems by aiding in the identification of unfriendly targets via the timely communication and fusion of unattended ground sensors (UGS) data with the radar picture. Tags will also help to identify friendly assets by adding a unique identification (ID) to their radar return that is fused to the radar picture. When combined with Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver with a tag, and using the tag to transmit the tagis geographic coordinates to the platform, the location of targets within a certain distance of the tag can be determined with great accuracy. [(2)]
Camouflage Identification System
Phil Sokolowski
The use of camouflage has been a critical part of military operations for centuries. Used most effectively in "Gorilla Warfare" tactics, camouflage gives a force unprecedented advantage over an adversary. The ultimate objective of camouflage is to be able achieve superiority over an enemy through surprise and concealment. Camouflage is now standard issue to all soldiers in the Armed Forces, and has possibilities for adaptive use that could combine the conventional use of concealment with the power of identification for the avoidance of friendly fire.
A proposed Camouflage Identification System (CIS) would consist of the following components:
· Camouflage Clothing
· Pattern Identification Radar
· Command and Control Database
· Field Information Receiver
Camouflage Clothing
The physical clothing that soldiers wear, as well as camouflage paint schemes that are applied to vehicles can be recreated to follow new patterns that are different from the currently used camouflage systems. Although the camouflage that is used in applications for today's military is optimized to provide maximum concealment in a given environment, the newly proposed camouflage pattern system would only be slightly different, (to create a pattern that would be equally as effective in concealment as traditional patterns) yet embed an additional piece of information in the pattern that could be deciphered by Pattern Identification Radar (PIR) to provide a unique identification number. This unique identification number can be decoded for any given piece of camouflage, as all patterns would in essence, be unique. This uniqueness can possibly be obtained through the adaptation of elliptical curve cryptography. The basis for this form of a cryptosystem is based on the intersection of elliptical curves, which could easily be derived in a physical fashion from their mathematical counterparts that are used in such cryptographic processes. When a PIR system interacts with an identification enhanced camouflage pattern, the PIR is able to distinguish that a unique code has been embedded within the camouflage, and then matches that code against a database to determine its validity.
Pattern Identification Radar
Pattern Identification Radar (PIR) is a proposed theoretical radar device that would be able to recognize the embedded patters that are described above. A PIR system would have the ability to operate over many square miles, possibly deployed from either strategically placed land units by field operatives, or an airborne vehicle. The PIR system would not only be able to detect just friendly forces, but also could possibly contain the functionality of being able to distinguish camouflage patterns of opposing forces as well. Since the PIR would already be specifically designed to recognize camouflage patterns, and the hidden information within for friendly forces, any attempted recognition of an obvious camouflage pattern that does not contain the embedded information would be recognized as a hostile threat, and marked accordingly. Size and speed of an object would be matched against previously collected information in the CCD (Command and Control Database) and used to extrapolate the most probable assignment of a vehicle type to unknown objects observed by the PIR.
Command and Control Database
Command and Control Database (CCD) is the most important aspect of the Camouflage Identification System. This database is the proverbial glue that binds the rest of the elements together. In essence, the CCD is responsible for the storage, retrieval, and accurate mapping of data to associated values. A CCD is complex in nature, with data values that are both wide and deep, and consist of hooks to allow access of information gathered from the PIR to other possible applications. (Such as medical history databases, intelligence reports, psychological profiles, etc.) The importance of the CCD providing the proper information for a given code obtained by the PIR through the embedded information in camouflage clothing is critical to the successful operation of the entire system. Improper mapping inside the CCD would give ambiguous results, and mark objects with inaccurate values, thus defeating the integrity of the entire system.
A CCD should be in place at the official command post for a given maneuver, and contain a list of pre-approved friendly units, and their appropriate embedded cipher coded numbers. When a PIR engages a known pattern, the pattern's information is sent to Command and Control, where it is then compared to the known friendly, and enemy databases. When a match is found as friendly, the appropriate information about that object is given to Command and Control, so that they can use it to direct units to take the next appropriate measure. In the case that no match is found, or if a known enemy unit is determined to be the given object, Command and Control is then alerted to the presence of a known, or possible hostile threat, and then relays the appropriate information to field units to proceed in a given manner so as to maintain superiority.
Field Information Receiver
Field Information Receivers (FIRs) are used to send information from Command and Control to field units. FIRs can either be conventional methods, or use a proposed system that would interact directly with the CCD in order to send instantaneous response to field units, when a matter of seconds is the difference between victory and defeat. A FIR would consist of either a visual eyepiece mounted on a soldier's helmet, or a display unit inside the CIS enabled vehicle. A more extreme measure consists of a head mounted unit that uses lasers to "paint" images directly onto the optic nerve of the individual wearing the device. A unit such as this would not interfere with the regular unobstructed vision of the soldier, and would eliminate bulky, obstructive equipment.
FIR units must be able to receive information obtained by the PIR, and analyzed by the CCD. A FIR does not need to possess the functionality of being able to transmit information, thus allowing for a minimized, passive unit that can easily be obscured and made undetectable. Since no transmitter is required, the FIR can not be detected by enemy sensors, and is low on power consumption. The data transmitted to the FIR would be encrypted, and transmitted over a separated signal band randomly composed of several frequencies. This technology would be analogous to spread spectrum transmissions.
Flow Of Information
The most practical aspects of a CIS system are the following:
_ Objects are identified through passive detection. No transmission from the object is required.
_ Transmission occurs in a downstream method. Only Command and Control must be able to both transmit and receive.
_ Numerous methodologies can be utilized to produce FIR units capable of guiding troops.
These characteristics allow for a system that not only delivers information to the soldier in the field in a quick and efficient method, but also creates a system that is difficult to detect, and ultimately, defeat. There are possibilities for an enemy counter-strike in the system, which are outlined below.
Possible Security Breaches
There are always possibilities for an enemy force to derive techniques to compromise the integrity of a system. CIS is no exception. There are several points in the system that need to be given special consideration in order to make them secure as possible so that carelessness in design is not used against the operation of the system.
_ Integrity of the CCD
_ Physical possession of camouflage clothing
_ Damage to camouflage clothing
_ Interception and manipulation of transmissions
_ False information given to FIR systems
_ Unauthorized possession of a FIR system
Integrity of the CCD is a critical aspect to the CIS. As mentioned earlier, the integrity of the CCD is an absolute essential in order to map appropriate traits to objects encountered in the field. A CCD that has had its security compromised can no longer be trusted, as it is impossible to conceptually relate a cipher code to its appropriate friendly or enemy value without relying entirely on the information stored in the database. Because of the complexity of the data stored and retrieved in a CCD, one must be able to trust the database's integrity absolutely.
In order to ensure the integrity of the database, the database system should perform two functions. 1> The system should be closed, so that outside intervention is impossible. 2> The system should store all collected information in a repository that is separate from the active database supplying information to the field. This way, misinformation can not be fed to the system through embedded techniques in specific patterns that could be cleverly designed to give false readings, or corrupted data to the CCD.
The possession of a cipher seeded camouflage pattern is required for an enemy force to falsify claims of friendly intentions to the CCD. In a proposed scenario, a soldier can be killed and his clothing taken into possession by an enemy force. This could possibly allow for the enemy force to duplicate the pattern and attempt to impersonate a friendly force in order to defeat the CIS. There are several ways to avoid this scenario.
First, it is impossible for more than one pattern to exist in any CCD. Since each pattern is mathematically derived, it is unique. Any attempts for an opposing force to duplicate captured patterns would immediately alert the CCD to this attempt when the PIR detects two identical patterns. Once detected, the pattern would immediately be marked as an adversary, and treated as such. The other possibility, that the captured patter is either not duplicated, or has an undetected doppelganger, is addressed through the logic of the CCD. The CCD could possibly contain information relevant to the training of a specific soldier assigned to a given pattern. If a soldier deviates from given behavior, his pattern can immediately be marked as suspect, and tracked for obvious actions of devious nature. (Such as many friendly units ceasing to function amidst a single suspect entity, or the location of a friendly force in a non approved, or questionable location.
Damage to the camouflage clothing is possible, as is the intentional efforts of enemy forces to attempt to change the patterns on soldier's clothing so as to convince the PIRs that a friendly object is actually hostile. In theory, the mathematical pattern behind the appearance of the pattern would be so complex, and the quality of the PIR's pattern recognition so high, that an assault of this nature would be ineffective. In another scenario, it is possible for the underlying mathematical algorithm represented in a pattern, to consist of a certain radar absorbing or reflecting material that would not even be susceptible to the optical pattern at all, and could rely only on radar signals. These materials could be woven into, or lye underneath the camouflage clothing. Optimally however, only the pattern itself, and no other material would be necessary.
Interception and the manipulation of transmissions from the PIR to the CCD are a possibility. In the unlikely scenario that enemy forces are able to break the encryption scheme used between Command and Control and PIR units, the information sent to the CCD must have an internal check to verify its integrity and source. Along the lines of transmission interception, it is also possible for enemy forces to discover a way to feed false information to the FIR systems. If a FIR unit was given a false signal containing incorrect information, the enemy force could easily destroy friendly targets by turning them in each other. A carefully planned misinformed signal could easily cause massive fratricide.
It is easier to overcome the possibilities of misinformation being fed to the CCD than it is to ensure that FIR units are not being sent incorrect data. The reason for this is that the CCD can contain artificial intelligence algorithms to ensure the appropriate information sent from the PIR follows obvious patterns, and is not contradictory with previously received information. However, if the CCD is completely bypassed, and an enemy force attempts to send misinformation directly to the FIR unit itself, and completely circumvent the CCD, any countermeasures that are distributed between the PIR and CCD are no longer effective.
The most optimal scenario for avoiding this is that the PIR, CCD, and FIR could all possibly be configured in a way with secure identification numbers that are synchronized on the CCD, PIR, and FIR, and changes every given time duration. This pre-determined algorithm would change the encryption seed on units at given intervals, and refuse to accept any data that is sent unless it contains the proper identification code, and signal source. (The signal source is derived from the matching secure number) Since the number changes very rapidly, in perfect synchronization on all units, (with each individual PIR, FIR, and CCD having unique matching secure numbers) the enemy can only (if ever) send misinformation for a few brief packets. Since the information sent in the false packets would easily mismatch the previously obtained packets, the most recent packets would be marked as suspect and kept on hold until the next data fragment arrived, which would then obviously contain new secure numbers, and the correct information. The CCD would then be able to determine that the previous set of data was falsified, and move into a state of increased awareness, changing secure codes even more frequently (if possible) and examining data patterns with increased scrutiny for the duration of the mission.
In the event that a FIR unit is captured, the enemy could instantly be given complete access to all information transmitted to said FIR. Since the current model for this system proposes that all FIRs receive the same information, it is not possible to send misinformation to the FIR to use a captured unit to our advantage. There are several possibilities however, although some are extreme, and others unconventional. No perfect solution for this situation has been reached at this time.
The first proposed theory is that a FIR could be designed in such a way that it is dependent on the biological traits of the soldier it is assigned to. Recent technologies have been introduced into the consumer market that can uniquely identify an individual on the basis of his blood vessel patterns in his face, fingerprint, retina patterns, or voice. In a system such as this, the unique retina pattern of an individual would give adequate security to the FIR unit. Although theoretically impractical by today's standards, it may soon be possible to embed a retinal scanner into the eyepiece of the FIR, and preprogram it to only receive information when the soldiers unique retina pattern is in constant view. If the unit was to be lost in combat and captured by enemy forces, the unit would cease to function without the soldier it was assigned to. In the event that a soldier is captured with the unit in an operational state, a preprogrammed sequence of eye blinking patters by the soldier could invoke a simple shutdown procedure to deactivate the unit permanently, and render it useless.
Conclusions
A CIS is a highly theoretical system that is not currently being explored. However, this team feels that it is possible for a system of this type to be developed given adequate time and research. Several drawbacks exist, with most them being attributed to the acute optical recognition systems needed in such a system, as well as the complexity and precise intricacies needed in a system such as this, where many variables must be in perfect synchronization for the system to work properly. This being the case, however, all of the theories proposed in this model are in deed sound, and perhaps one day possible. A system of this nature, if it is developed, would function adequately, and make unique identification methods available without any need for information transmitting devices.
What countermeasures should be taken to protect against electromagnetic interference? Where should redundant systems be established?
Ryan Anderson
To start a discussion about the ramifications of electromagnetic interference, first we must define it, and explain why it is a problem. Electromagnetic interference, also know as radio frequency interference (RFI) occurs when a high-power electromagnetic wave interacts with electronic devices. These devices will typically fail outright, or behave in unpredictable manners. Amateur radio operators, and those living near them, have dealt with these issues for years, sometimes unsuccessfully. The most typical type of RFI seen by the public is interference with cordless phones, or even regular phones, interference with TV reception, and unusual computer crashes. These last occurrences often go undetected, but sometimes are influenced by RFI.
The type of electromagnetic interference we are concerned with in this paper is much stronger than the above type. The solid-state (transistor and microchip) based electronics are extremely vulnerable to the effects of high-energy waves. The types of waves that truly concern us are typically man-made, but may occasionally occur in nature. Specifically, nuclear explosions create tremendous electromagnetic waves, strong enough in theory, to disable entire cities worth of computers and electronic devices. Clearly, this would be enough to make communications and coordination of troops in the field much more difficult. (3)
One extremely well known and well circulated rumor involves guns or other weaponry light enough to be carried that could have much the same effect as a nuclear detonation, albeit on a much smaller scale. These weapons are known as HERF, or EMP guns. HERF, or High Energy Radio Frequency, weapons are theoretically possible, but whether they are practical or not remains to be seen. It is believed by some that such a weapon would kill all the people in the area it was affecting, including the user. Clearly, such a portable weapon would not appreciated by its users. (4) These weapons, however, do not all have to be hand-delivered. Satellite based attacks against other satellites would be advantageous for a nation seeking to disable parts of an enemy satellite network, however space based lasers or missiles may be more effective. (Lasers especially, due to the possibility of repeated firing by recharging from solar energy.)
The magnitude of such an attack on a system is illustrated by Sergeant Dallas E. Shaw, in his essay "It Takes More than Technology".(5) Here Sergeant Shaw illustrates how the failure of some minor technology (compasses, for example) can cripple poorly trained squads of infantry in the field. This is clearly a problem in the modern military.
Natural causes of electromagnetic radiation are primarily solar flares or lightning strikes. Solar flares can interfere with satellite communications or general long distance communications, but typically do not cause any damage to electronics. Furthermore, they are extremely unpredictable and thus are not a large source of concern for the military. It helps that the efforts taken to protect against deliberate EMP attacks will in most cases completely eliminate the damage-causing possibilities of solar flares. Lightning strikes are mainly a concern for ground-based systems. Here, simple precautions such as lightning rods in high-risk areas should eliminate most of the risks.
To protect against these electromagnetic pulses requires some standard precautions. Electromagnetic waves don't travel well through conductors, so properly constructed metal shielding, either with solid sheets of metal or with fine wire mesh can prevent a great deal of the potential attacks. For absolutely critical systems, thicker sheets of metal in the walls of the room containing them would prevent the damaging radiation. For troops in the field, adequate protection is directly related with weight. So a systems designer must weigh the reduced effectiveness of the troops against the possibility of their equipment failing due to electromagnetic pulses. Due to the low likelihood of such an attack in the immediate future, a prudent commander may opt for improved training and low-tech solutions to this problem.
Redundancy in command and control systems is extremely important. It's important that minor attacks on the system do not disable it, or even seriously damage its ability to function. It's also important that if the systems does fail, independent backup systems exist, and even should all the systems fail, it's still possible to get the job done. To satisfy these requirements, it is obvious that a robust communications network is needed, and the training to properly use it, as well as enough training to get by when it fails.
To do this, troops need to know certain things. They need basic direction finding techniques, basic combat techniques, basic communications techniques, covering all levels of technology. For example, during a dedicated jamming attack, few voice-based communications will get through without specialized equipment, which in turn is easy to attack. However, Morse Code based communications systems, specifically CW (continuous wave). As Sergeant Shaw mentions in his article, CW was crucial during Desert Storm for maintaining communications during enemy jamming. These kinds of technology issues are vital to maintain combat superiority in the digital age.
The maxim to learn from all this is that technology is only good when it is functional, and it must be expected to fail. It then follows that it is important for troops to have the training to function if (when) the systems actually do fail.
If the system is publicly known, what methods can be used to secure it?
Richie
MDAT is a system of detection that we as a group came up with. With this system we are designing a digital warrior which is going to be invincible. A lot other systems already exist, but our system takes the best qualities from those systems and we have incorporated a lot of ideas and come up with this model. Our main objective is to design a system that best implements today technology to come up with a superior system of defense.
Our digital warrior is going to have the latest technology and is going to a warrior who depends on computer and technology more than his own senses. The helmet of our warrior is one of the most significant part of his armor. In his helmet is his ear phone. So our warrior can listen to his commands on the battle field. Plus he also has a mouth piece which is used to communicate to other on the field and also serves as a security feature. The mouth piece is used for voice recognition. The antenna is inside the helmet too. To protect our warrior eyes he is given special eyewear, these take off the glare of the desert sun or reflections of the ice and also work as light intensifiers. Attached to the helmet and the sunglasses is a monocle. This monocle is a computerized screen, which keeps are warrior aware of the action going on the battle field. The eyepiece is a display with shows infrared images of the surroundings to the warrior, along with the picture of the surroundings the warrior gets a pictures of the entire battle field from different view point (birds view point, fish view point etc). The warrior with the touch of a buttons get to decide which view point he wishes to see through. The monocle can also be used as binoculars they warrior can manually zoom in and out and magnify objects. At each point the warrior is connected to the GPS and the COM 3 satellites, so he knows his exact location and with the help of satellites we know where the entire squadron is. Smart cards are used to variefy the ID of the warrior. The warrior may pick different modes and see where his backups are and he can also tell if any of his comrads is hurt and he can come to there rescue.
Our warrior is going to have the state of the art gloves, which protect him from the heat and cold. On his wrist is going to be attached a key board which the warrior can use to send message to his comards. These messages are send using PGP keys so they enemy cannot intercept these messages. We will have wires monitering the heart of the our warroir. If we notice any abnormalities we can check up on our soldier. The riffle assigned to our soldier will be start of art technology, and on top of the riffle there will be a camera, which will use advanced infrared sensors and scan 2,200 meters, even through thick foliage and then diaplays the image in the eyepiece. The image is also send back to the COM3 satellites and so headquater knows where the enemy is located and they can come up with the best line of defense.
Many security issues arise with our warrior. If our warrior is shot or is sometimes tries to
use this equipment without proper authorization. After two false attempts to start the system, the system will shut down and go into self dustruct mode. Secondly the system only works when the proper smart card is inserted and also if the voice recognizer matches the two voices. If a warrior is down his system is shut down permanently, till headquarters reactivates it. So no other warrior or country can steal our technology.
.
Which info is needed on the battlefield, and by whom? Consider the possibilities of information overload.
Ryan Anderson
Information overload is a problem in any system where large amounts of data are processed. This issue comes to light whenever troops have more information available than they can reliably process. Frequently, troops do not need to know the identity of every soldier in the vicinity, they simply need to know where the other soldiers are. This clearly implies that a certain amount of filtration is required to keep the military functional.
This requirement forces us to consider who needs what information. It is clear that a commander viewing the whole battlefield may need to know where various troops are, and which units they belong to. It is also clear that giving a battlefield commander the name of every single troop on the battlefield is a horrendous mistake and probably enough to make the information completely useless.
From these simple examples, we can draw up some principles of information distribution:
At various levels, these considerations can be expanded. Front-line troops often don't need big picture views of the battlefield, and shouldn't have them. On the other hand, unit and division commanders often need the bigger view to handle the overall battle, while the battlefield commanders clearly need to know where everything is on the battlefield to be able to adequately direct the flow and direction of the battle. Looking at the battlefield from the other direction, commanders frequently do not need to see every single soldier or vehicle in the battle, rather, the commander needs to know where general groups of units are, and general layouts of units, more so than exact positions. As you move down the line of command to the troop on the front line, the exact location of enemy units becomes vastly more important to know. If a front-line soldier does not know that the enemy is 300 meters away, and not 400, it is a problem. For the battlefield commander, the difference is probably nto significant. (The troops are very close in either case, and probably under fire. The commander does not need to know exactly what weaponry may be in range, while the troops on the line certainly want to know.)
What countermeasures can be taken to utilize compromised portions of the system, including people?
Ryan Anderson
The principals of information distribution translate well when security ramifications come into play. If some of the gear that gives this information is captured or compromised, it is important that the tactical advantage lost is not massive enough to affect the battle significantly. This is a principal of military security at all levels: Information is distributed on a need to know basis. It is important to have ways to detect the capture or compromise of units or their gear, and to be able to disable this gear. A great deal of these considerations rely upon authentication of the users who are using the system.
Various methods of authentication have been proposed, including public-key encryption, smart cards, passwords, biometric identification, etc. Some of these ideas have been considered in a previous section. Here, we revisit the possibility of using smart cards and some biometric techniques to prevent compromise of systems.
It is important to disable hand-held systems in the even of the capture or death of a soldier, hopefully without human intervention. One possible way to handle this is to have a pulse monitor attached to a soldier's wrist. Thus, if the soldier dies or drops the weapon, it disables the information distribution portion of its system. The soldier then most then reauthenticate to recover this information system. If the soldier is captured, it should be possible to utilize a duress code that activates the system, but in a low-information mode, hopefully passing along false information or maybe just incomplete information, while appearing to function perfectly. This change in status can then be transmitted back to the command and control base so that the compromise of the device is known and added to the data being collected, and provides some information back.
1. 1 In the packet of materials delivered for this report - "Tactical Technology Solicitations: BAA 97-14"
2. 2 In the packet of materials delivered for this report -"Proposer Information for BAA 98-20, RF Tags Program"
3. 3See http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/textonly/1,1035,1189,00.html for a
reference to anactual occurcene of this during testing, and some related information.
4. 4 http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/textonly/1,1035,1189,00.html , ibid.
5. 5In the packet of materials delivered for this report.