Military Security - How to Prevent Friendly Fire

• Introduction

This paper takes a look at the various systems available for prevention of friendly fire, and seeks to perform a preliminary analysis of them.




• What methods are used to avoid friendly fire? How do these methods work and interoperate with each other? When and where are these methods most effective, taking into account weather and terrain?
• Methods to avoid friendly Fire?
• Optical radar
• Computer camouflage
• AWACS planes
• Samart cards
• RF tags
• IUGS
• AFFS
• Ground robot
• small unit operations
• MSTAR



• Friendly Situation Awareness
• Use ID location of:
• friendly personal
• medical Assets
• vehicles
• mine fields
• RF Tags
• 3 types of TAGS
• -ID only tag
• -Low data rate tag
• -High data rate tag



• Airborne radars:
• -MIT
• MIT tags
• -ID tags
• -JSTARS
• -Successful Flight Demonstration
• -SAR
• SAR vs. MIT
• Multi platforms
• -Radar
• -Signal processing
• -Tag architecture
• Airborne SAR vs. Space borne SAR
• Synthetic Environments ( SE )
• -Advanced Simulation Technology Thrust
• I3-Intelligent Integration of Information Technology
• Battle Awareness and Data Dissemination
• JV2020



• What countermeasures should be taken to protect against electromagnetic interference? Where should redundant systems be established?
• electromagnetic interference
• Brief description
• Types of
• Man-made
• Nuclear
• EM interference is a side effect of nuclear detonations. This has been postulated as a very effective means to disable a high-tech nation's infrastructure. The US is highly vulnerable to such an attack.
• HERF (and related) weaponry
• HERF attacks on satellites and ground-based stations could disable temporarily or permanently communications systems, thus vastly hurting the ability of a nation, and army, to wage war. The dependence of the modern armed forces on high-tech communications gear is highlighted by (Marine Corp Essay Contest, 2^nd Honorable Mention)...
• Natural
• Protection from
• Shielding
• Shielding is similar to Tempest protection systems, in that the primary design goal is to separate two areas of electromagnetic radiation. In this case, we want to keep high-power fields out, but standard metal shielding, with limited openings are the primary means of protection.
• Adequate protection invs. related with weight. :-)
• Protection (surge?) circuitry
• Redundant Systems
• Training
• troops need to know how to use non-technological systems, pen and paper, to function should the techno systems fail. Even less technical, yet more reliable systems are useful for getting the "guts" of a message through when needed.
• Backup communication systems
• see above. CW, for ex, can sub for true voice comms when voice comms can be blocked. Rudimentary codes (not crypts) can be used in a pinch. Time-relevant decoding can render the vulnerability of the message not an issue. By the time the enemy understands the message, they may be under attack and figuring it out the hard way.
• Direction gear
• Maps and other low-tech tools
• Satellite systems
• extra satellites
• satellites are highly vulnerable in space, due to flying dust, space-based satellite laser attacks, etc. Redundant systems and even dummy, decoy, satellites are potentials to help keep a system running in the event of a real attack.
• extra downlinks
• disguising true downlinks by having multiple centers that could be coordinating combats reduces the potential for attacks to disable one C3 center and weaken the attack force.



• If the system is publicly known, what methods can be used to secure it?

Encryption authentication systems, public key vs private key, mathematical proofs of systems. Also, consider Communications Security, the partial document/thoughts put together by Ryan.




• What countermeasures can be taken to utilize compromised portions of the system, including people?

Effectiveness of standard counter-intelligence techniques in digital age....




• Which info is needed on the battlefield, and by whom? Consider the possibilities of information overload.

Aggregate collections of data to commanders, detailed local data to troops, etc... Some of the selection criteria involved.




• Conclusion